My research focuses on egalitarian philosophy and on the doctrine of basic equality, according to which all human beings are equal in some sense that is important for ethics, politics and the law. As I see it, there are four related riddles surrounding this doctrine:

  • Meaning: What do we mean when we say that human beings are equal?
  • Justification: In virtue of what are human beings equals? What makes basic equality true?
  • Scope: Are all human beings equal? Are only humans beings equal?
  • Implications: What does basic equality imply for ethics, politics and the law?

These are the questions I take up in my research. In my dissertation, A defense of Basic Equality (University of Chicago, June 2018), I argue that basic equality is grounded in the moral obligation to respect human beings. I claim that when understood in this way, basic equality can be reconciled with the significant differences we observe among humans, and has a better chance of answering some traditional and new skeptical concerns.

I currently have several papers under review in philosophy journals, regarding the justification of basic equality (titles are not mentioned to respect the integrity of the blind-review process):

  1. In one paper, I defend basic equality against the common charge that humans are too different to be equal. I argue that this skeptical argument against basic equality works only if we assume that basic equality is derived from the Aristotelian principle known as formal equality, according to which “equal cases should be treated and unequal cases unequally.” Using several novel thought-experiments, I claim that basic equality cannot be understood as an instance of this broader principle, and so that a common skeptical objection to basic equality rests on a mistake.
  2. In another paper, I tackle the question of whether there is any significant personal attribute that all human beings have equally. Most existing defenses of basic equality attempt to identify some valuable individual characteristic—be it rationality, autonomy or something else—that all humans have to an equal degree. My own preferred defense of basic equality is not of this kind, but in this paper I defend a version of it: I argue that all cognitively able, adult human beings have the property “moral agency” (defined as the capacity to perform actions for which one is morally responsible) to an equal degree. I discuss the implication of this claim for the defense of basic equality.

Here are some other papers I currently work on (and hope to complete in the near future.

Evil and Equality: This is a paper about the scope of basic equality. I attempt to answer a question I often get when I tell people what I work on: “Do you want to say that I am equal to Hitler?” In this paper, I assess the concern this question expresses, and argue that it can be answered. Basic equality does not imply the kind of absurdities that someone who asks the question has in mind.

The Moral Status of Individuals in Permanent Vegetative States: This is also a paper about the scope of basic equality. Many philosophers believe such individuals in Permanent Vegetative States (PVS), unlike individuals in temporary coma, have no significant moral status. I argue that there is no morally relevant difference between individuals in PVS and individuals in temporary coma, and that if the latter have a significant moral status, so do the former.

The Best Argument for Cosmopolitan Justice? This paper is now under review. It concerns the normative implications of basic equality. According to one popular view, distributive egalitarianism is justified by basic equality. We deserve to have equal shares of some good because we are morally equal. Suppose that’s correct. Many philosophers assume that this entails cosmopolitanism, the view distributive justice does not, in principle, recognize state boundaries. In this paper I show that this cosmopolitan argument is based on a mistake.

In the last year, I collaborated with Dr. Efrat Ram-Tiktin from Bar-Ilan University in a project whose goal is to develop a theory of distributive justice in education. Efrat and I believe that a prerequisite for such an inquiry is to get a better sense of the value of childhood. Is it a good thing that we all spend a non-negligible amount of time as children? Is childhood only instrumentally good, as a stage leading to adulthood, where the real value in human life lies? We believe in a what we call “the Development View,” according to which it is intrinsically good for humans to go through a process of transitioning from childhood to adulthood. One paper we wrote on the topic, “Why Adults have to be Children First” is forthcoming in The Journal of Value Inquiry. Another paper is currently under review.

Feel free to email me if you’re interested in seeing drafts or discussing any of the above!

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